Incommensurability and rationality in engineering design: the case of functional decomposition

In engineering design research different models of functional decomposition are advanced side-by-side. In this paper I explain and validate this co-existence of models in terms of the Kuhnian thesis of methodological incommensurability. I advance this analysis in terms of the thesis’ construal of (non-algorithmic) theory choice in terms of values, expanding this notion to the engineering domain. I further argue that the (by some) implicated threat of the thesis to rational theory choice has no force in the functional decomposition case: co-existence of different models of functional decomposition is rational from an instrumental point of view. My explanation covers cases in which different models are advanced as means for the same objective. Such cases cannot be explicated with the explanatory construct of variety in objectives, as advanced in other analyses of co-existing conceptualizations in engineering

On relating functional modeling approaches: abstracting functional models from behavioral models

This paper presents a survey of functional modeling approaches and describes a strategy to establish functional knowledge exchange between them. This survey is focused on a comparison of function meanings and representations. It is argued that functions represented as input-output flow transformations correspond to behaviors in the approaches that characterize functions as intended behaviors. Based on this result a strategy is presented to relate the different meanings of function between the approaches, establishing functional knowledge exchange between them. It is shown that this strategy is able to preserve more functional information than the functional knowledge exchange methodology of Kitamura, Mizoguchi, and co-workers. The strategy proposed here consists of two steps. In step one, operation-on-flow functions are translated into behaviors. In step two, intended behavior functions are derived from behaviors. The two-step strategy and its benefits are demonstrated by relating functional models of a power screwdriver between methodologies

Constitutive relevance in cognitive science : the case of eye movements and cognitive mechanisms

In this paper I assess whether the recently proposed "No De-Coupling" (NDC) theory of constitutive relevance in mechanisms is a useful tool to reconstruct constitutive relevance investigations in scientific practice. The NDC theory has been advanced as a framework theoretically superior to the mutual manipulability (MM) account of constitutive relevance in mechanisms but, in contrast to the MM account, has not yet been applied to detailed case studies. I argue that the NDC account is also applicable to empirical practice and that it fares better than the MM account on both theoretical and empirical grounds. I elaborate these claims in terms of applications of the NDC theory to two case studies of cognitive science research on the role of eye movements in mechanisms for cognitive capacities. (C) 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved

Difference making, explanatory relevance, and mechanistic models

In this paper we consider mechanistic explanations for biologic malfunctions. Drawing on Lipton’s (1993) work on difference making, we offer three reasons why one should distinguish i) mechanistic features that only make a difference to the malfunction one aims to explain, from ii) features that make a difference to both the malfunction and normal functioning. Recognition of the distinction is important for a) repair purposes, b) mechanism discovery, and c) understanding. This analysis extends current mechanistic thinking, which fails to appreciate the distinction. We illustrate our contribution with a case on sleeping disorders as arising from disruptions of circadian rhythms.; En este artículo tomamos en consideración las explicaciones mecanicistas de las disfunciones biológicas. A partir del trabajo de Lipton (1993) sobre diferenciación ( difference making), damos tres razones por las que se debería distinguir entre: i) aspectos mecanicistas que sólo suponen una diferencia para la disfunción que se pre- tende explicar, y ii) aspectos que suponen una diferencia tanto para la disfunción como para el funcionamiento normal. Reconocer la distinción tiene importancia para: a) fine s de reparación, b) el descubrimiento de mecanismos, y c) la comprensión. Este análisis extiende el pensamiento mecanicista actual, que no llega a percibir la distinción. Ilustramos nuestra contribución con un caso de desorden del sueño que surge de disrupciones de los ritmos circadianos

Difference making, explanatory relevance, and mechanistic models

In this paper we consider mechanistic explanations for biologic malfunctions. Drawing on Lipton’s (1993) work on difference making, we offer three reasons why one should distinguish i) mechanistic features that only make a difference to the malfunction one aims to explain, from ii) features that make a difference to both the malfunction and normal functioning. Recognition of the distinction is important for a) repair purposes, b) mechanism discovery, and c) understanding. This analysis extends current mechanistic thinking, which fails to appreciate the distinction. We illustrate our contribution with a case on sleeping disorders as arising from disruptions of circadian rhythms

Ontic explanation is either ontic or explanatory, buth not both

This paper advances three related arguments showing that the ontic conception of explanation (OC), which is often adverted to in the mechanistic literature, is inferentially and conceptually incapacitated, and in ways that square poorly with scientific practice. Firstly, the main argument that would speak in favor of OC is invalid, and faces several objections. Secondly, OC's superimposition of ontic explanation and singular causation leaves it unable to accommodate scientifically important explanations. Finally, attempts to salvage OC by reframing it in terms of 'ontic constraints' just concedes the debate to the epistemic conception of explanation. Together, these arguments indicate that the epistemic conception is more or less the only game in town